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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
DAVID ALLEN PATTERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17610 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with forgery in violation of 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-6-SOl(l){b) (1978) in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. 
Sorenson, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found 
g11il ty of one count oi: forgery o:i February 11, 1981. On 
February 27, 1981 the trial court sentenced appellant to an 
indeterminate term of not less then one year nor more than 
fifteen years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Res9ondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court 
affir~ing the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 20, 1980, appellant, David Allen 
Patterson, and James Matheos drove to Morris Motors in Provo, 
Utah, to rent a car (T. 91). James Matheos, originally a co-
defendant and later a witness for the prosecution in the case, 
was appellant's friend and had lived next door to appellant's 
brother, Carl Patterson (T. 87). According to the written 
rental agreement, appellant signed for the car at about 10:20 
a.m. (T. 30). Matheos, however, testified that the two rentei 
the car at 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. at the latest. Originally, 
Matheos attempted to rent the car, but was unsuccessful (T. 
69, 76). Appellant then represented himself to be, and used 
the identification of, "Micah Roy Woodward" to rent the car 
(T. 29, 30, 69, 108). Woodward, the true owner of the 
driver's license and identification, testified that he had 
lost the license and identification earlier that year, and 
t'.:lat he did not authorize appellant to use Woodward's name anc 
identification or to represent himself to be l'Joodward (T. 81), 
Appellant and ~atheos drove the car, a copper-
colored AMC Concord, to Springville, Utah (T. 30, 33, 76). 
They reconnoitered several houses in the h,ills around Hobble 
Creek Canyon (T. 70, 75). The third of fourth house they 
stopped at belonged to Mr. Leon Swenson (T. 71, 76). By 
coincidence, Mr. Swenson unexpectedly returned home about 
10:15 or 11:00 a.m., shortly after appellant and Matheos 
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arrived (T. 36-38). Mr. Swenson asked appellant what he was 
looking for and appellant said he was looking for "Dale Dixon" 
(T. 37). Informed that Dale Dixon did not live at that 
residence, the two left and drove east of the Canyon Road 
e, toward the house of Mr. Stanley Burningham (T. 37, 70). 
Appellant entered Mr. Burningham's home while 
Matheos waited outside in the rented car (T. 70, 74-75). 
Appellant returned to the car with some checks and savings 
& bonds belonging to Mr. Burningham (T. 71, 75). Mr. Burningham 
discovered and reported the theft later that afternoon (T. 
46-49). 
Following the burglary of the Burningham home, 
appellant and Matheos drove to First Security Bank in 
Springville, Utah, to cash one of the checks they had stolen 
(T. 72). Appellant asked Matheos to write out the front of 
the check and discussed the amount, $2,666.00, with him (T. 
~ 731. ~atheos signed Burni'1qha~'s name to the check, ~ade it 
), pa:/a::ile to "Roy WoodVTard," and dated it (T. 72). Appellant 
'c?e:-i:: irito the bank to cash t 11e check ( T. 73). 
Inside the bank, appellant endorsed the check in the 
teller's presence and presented it to be cashed (T. 50-51). 
The teller noticed the signatures on the check were irregular 
and consulted the bank manager (T. 59). After discussing the 
check with appellant, the bank manager refused to cash the 
c':e~: (T. "l2-63). In atte~~ting to cash the forged check 
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appellant represented himself to be "Roy Woodward" to both 
Leslee Hansen, the bank teller, and Roger Williams, the bank 
manager (T. 52, 62, 64-65). 
Having failed to cash the forged check, the pair 
drove to a drive-in hamburger restaurant in Spanish Fork, 
Utah, and disposed of the checkbook in a trash dumpster (T. 
7 3). The next day, Matheos assisted Detective Fox of the Ut~ 
County Sheriff's Department in recovering the checkbook from 
the dumpster ( T. 73, 83). Fingerprints taken from the 
checkbook matched appellant's (T. 119-125). 
The written rental agreement indicated that 
appellant and Matheos returned the renten car to Morris Motor: 
about 1:30 that afternoon (T. 21, 30). Matheos, however, 
testified that they returned the car at 4:30 or 5:00 p.m. (T. 
74). The pair then left Morris Motors in appellant's Grand 
Prix (T. 34). 
Appellant's version of the events which occurred oo 
November 20, 1980 was substantially different from the facts 
presented above and was supported by t~e testimony of 
appellant's mother, Kay Lue Patterson, his brother, Carl 
Patterson, and his girlfriend, Judy Stubbs', Many of the 
contradictory statements of these witnesses are set out in thi 
Statement of Facts in Appellant's Brief. However, appella~ 
does not raise a claim of insufficiency of the evidence or an 
this case. 
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Appellant's claim arises from the cross-examination 
o~ James Matheos at trial. The trial judge sustained the 
prosecution's objections to defense counsel's questions 
directed to Matheos concerning the number and nature of 
felonies matheos had previously been convicted of, and the 
number of burglary charges the prosecution had agreed to 
dis~iss in exchange for Matheos' testimony in the instant case 
(T. 77-78). On appeal, appellant claims the trial court 
thereby unduly restricted his right of cross-examination. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT UNDULY RESTRICT 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF CROSS-EX~~INATION. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court 
unduly restricted the right of cross-examination afforded him 
by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
constitution which assure the right of confrontation. 
Specifically, appellant was restricted in his cross-examina-
tion of James Matheos, a witness for the State, concerning the 
number of felonies Matheos had previously been convicted of, 
the nature of the felony(ies), and the number of currently 
pending charges the State had agreed to dismiss if Matheos 
testified in the instant case. The following is the pertinent 
dialogue between appellant's counsel, Matheos and the trial 
-5-
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judge: 
Q. What time did you do this burglary at 
Mr. Burningha~'s residence? 
A. I believe it was 9:00--between 9:00 
and l O: 00. 
Q. Could have been later? 
A. I don't know, sir. I don't think so. 
Q. Have you ever been convicted of a 
felony, Mr. Matheos? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where at? 
A. Virginia. 
MR. WATSON: I will object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. Carter) What was the nature of 
the accusation you were convicted of? 
MR. WATSON: I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. His answer to the 
first question may remain. 
Q. (By Mr. Carter) How Dany felonies have 
you been convicted of? 
MR. WATSON: I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q, (By Mr. Carter) Tell me about your 
deal you made with Mr. Watson. 
A. Re just--when I first got pulled over 
at American Fork I went down. They asked 
me, you know, about everything that went 
on and I wouldn't say nothing. And then I 
(':'!'""'"''-:? ("l'Jt ;:in~ -I-,-., l -4 t-1.-.,-.,r;-i 0 1 ~-,~y"::! j ·~(J "T: l:·lC>\'• 
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Q. How many burglaries is he going to 
dismiss for your testimony? 
MR. WATSON: Your Honor, I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. I will have to 
give you a caution, Mr. Carter. 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I would like to 
make a proffer at this point. 
(T. 77-78). According to appellant, the object of the cross-
examination was to elicit evidence indicating ~atheos's 
possible bias and motive for testifying as he had. This was 
to be done, in part, by requiring Matheos to c~-,1ulge the 
number and nature of the felony(ies) for which he had been 
convicted prior to his involvement in the instant case, and 
also by disclosing to the jury the plea bargain the State had 
made with Matheos. 
Many cases have held that the extent of cross-
exa~ination is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge. State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015, 1017 
(1978); State v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1977); 
S_tat_EO:_v .. J\.nderson, 27 L'tah 2d 276, 495 P,2cl 804, 806 (1972). 
The record does not disclose in detail the basis for the trial 
court's decision, but does indicate that the trial judge 
curtailed the cross-examination, in part, on the basis of Rule 
-7-
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45, Utah Rules of Evidencel and the fact that the plea 
bargain was already before the jury (T. 76, 67-68). The on~ 
matters the jury was not directly informed of <'luring cross-
examination of Matheos were the number and nature of 
felony( ies) he hal'l been convicted of. Responc'lent agrees that 
generally a threshhold inquiry into the number an<'l nature of 
felony(ies) of which a witness has been convicted is allowed, 
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2<'1 266, 382 l".2d 407, 409 (1963). 
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, however, 
neither the trial court's restriction of appellant's cross-
examination pertaining to the number and nature of felony 
convictions, nor the curtailment of the disclosure of the 
details of the plea bargain ma<'le between the State and 
Matheos, whether considered separately or together, requires 
reversal of the unanimous guilty verdict. 
lutah Rules of Evidence, Rule 45 provides: 
Except as in these rules otherwise 
nr0virler1. thp -iu<1r.~ Tl"lf?\! il'. 'r:is rlisc~~ti011 
~xclude ~viden~e if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of 
time, or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues 
or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly 
and harmfully surprise a party who has not 
had reasonable opportunity to anticipate 
that such evidence '10uld be offered. 
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State v. Chesnut, Utah, 621 P. 2d 1228 ( 1980), set 
forth the appropriate standard of review for claims of 
improper restriction of the right of cross-examination: 
Since the trial court undulv restricted 
rlefenclant in the exercise of his 
constitutional right of cross-examination, 
the review thereof is controlled by the 
constitutional harmless error standard of 
Chapman v. California. This standard 
compels reversal unless the reviewing 
court can declare a belief that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
[Footnote omitted]. 
Id. at 1233. Not all constitutional errors, nor all 
restrictions of a defenclant's right of cross-examination, 
however, impair the defendant's cause to the extent requiring 
reversal. The United States Supreme Court, in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), stated: 
Id. at 2 2. 
( 19 7 4) : 
We conclude that there may be some 
constitutional errors which in the setting 
of a particular case are so unimportant 
and insignificant that they may, 
consistent with the Federal Constitution, 
be deemed harcless, not requiring the 
automatic re~ersal of the conviction. 
T'ie above statement 11as re-e1J1phas izec'! in "lr. 
The Court holds that, in the circumstances 
of this case, the Sixth and Fourteenth 
A~en~~e~ts co~~er~~~ tJ1e right to cross-
examine a particular prosecution witness 
-"-
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about his delinquency adjudication for 
burglary and his status as a probationer. 
Such cross-examination ~as necessary in 
this case in order "to sho11 the existence 
of possible bias and prejudice , , , " 
ante, at 317. In joining the Court's 
opinion, I would emphasize that the Court 
neither holds nor suggests that the 
Constitution confers a right in every case 
to impeach the general credibility of a 
witness through cross-examination about 
his past delinquency adjudications or 
criminal convictions. 
Id. at 321. Also in agreement is State v. Scandrett, 24 Ut~ 
2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970), where this Court stated: 
There certainly are conceivable 
circumstances where the violation of a 
constitutional right could have no 
possible bearing upon any unfairness or 
imposition upon the defendant, or upon a 
correct determination of his guilt or 
innocence. We think the correct view, and 
the one which is both practical and in 
keeping with the desired objective of 
fundamental fairness and due process of 
law, is that there is a presumption that 
such error is prejudicial, but that it can 
be overcome when the court is convinced 
beyond- a reasonable doubt that it had no 
such prejudicial effect upon the 
proceedings. Correlative to this it is 
also true that when the guilt is shown by 
other untainted evidence so overwhelming 
t 1: 0 t:. 't 'r! e r r:? ~ r: -: ') , i 1:: e 1 ~- ~ 0 r'\~ \: ~ .:- ts 2-= ._-c :- o.: 
a different result in the absence of such 
error or irregularity, there should be no 
reversal [Footnotes omitted]. 
Id. at 643. Respondent submits that there are several fac~r 
in the instant case which, when considered in sum, establish 
that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
-10-
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The first of these factors involves the fact that 
even if appellant was unable to fully explore the details of 
the plea bargain Matheos made with the State by cross-
examining Matheos, the matter had already been effectively 
presented to the jury. During direct examination Matheos 
testified that he was originally a co-defendant in the case, 
that he had been allowed to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser 
included offense and that the plea bargain he had made with 
the State would not influence his testimony: 
Q. Mr. Matheos, you were originally 
charged as a co-defendant in the matter 
presently before the Court, were you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As a result of plea negotiations 
between yourself and the State of Utah you 
have been permitted to enter a plea of 
guilty to a lesser included offense, have 
you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have done so? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell the Court and the jury if your 
testimony here today is going to be based 
upon the fact that you have just taken an 
oath or upon any deal you have made with 
the State of Utah? 
THE COURT: I don't think he understands. 
You had better put that in Anglo-Saxon 
English, Mr. Watson. 
Q. (By Mr. Watson) Is your testimony here 
going to be the truth? 
-11-
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it going to be based upon your 
observations made on the 20th of November, 
1980? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is your testimony going to be 
influenced in any fashion by the fact that 
the State of Utah and you have made a deal 
concerning the entry of plea in this 
matter? 
A. No, sir. 
(T. 67-68). Because evidence of Matheos's involvement int~ 
crime and the plea bargain entered into with the State had 
already been presented to the jury for their consideration, 
further questioning on the subject would have added little, 
anything, to appellant's defense and would have constituted 
the type of repetitive questioning which was recognized by 
this Court as being a qualification or limitation of the ri~ 
to cross-examine an adverse witness in State v. Chesnut, Utah 
621 ?.2d 1228, 1233 (1980). Impeachment evidence which is 
merely cumulative to other impeachment evidence may be 
pro::>erly excluded even if it is otherwise admissible. State 
v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1977); State v. 
Oniskor, 29 Utah 2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973); People v. Bliss, 
222 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. 1966). 
Second, appellant's questions on cross-examination 
themselves, although unanswered, implied appellant's 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contentions. In State v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386, 1388 
(1977), this Court addressed the question of restriction of 
cross-examination and made note of State v. Chance, 185 S.E.2d 
227 (N.C. 1971), where the court found that the "defendant by 
his question carried the full force and implication of his 
contention." Id. at 234. In the instant case, the jury was 
able to draw the intended inference as to Matheos 's past 
criminal activity from the unanswered questions pertaining to 
the number and nature of felonies for which he had previously 
been convicted. Thus appellant's contentions were adequately 
presented to the jury and the lack of specific answers had no 
significant detrimental effect on appellant's defense. 
Third, at trial the State produced "evidence so 
overwhelming that there is no likelihood whatsoever of a 
different result in the absence of such error or 
irregularity." Scandrett, supra, at 643; See also: State v. 
Oniskor, 29 Utah'2d 395, 510 P.2d 929 (1973) at 931. Notably, 
appellant has not argued his innocence, nor challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this case. .11.ppellant was not 
convicted by virtue of Matheos's testimony alone. Both the 
teller and the manager at First Security Bank where appellant 
uttered the forged check testified that appellant represented 
himself to be "Roy Woodward." In addition to the forged check 
itself, fingerprints lifted from the stolen checkbook from 
:',ici-1 th"? forged check was taken matched appellant's. This 
-13-
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and other evidence produced at trial was sufficient, absent 
Matheos's testimony, to convict appellant. Because of the 
overwhelming evidence in this case, the alleged error fails, 
provide a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have 
been different. 
Finally, appellant has made no showing of how the 
expected answers to the questions Matheos was not allowed ~ 
ans~er would have bolstered his defense beyond what was 
actually brought out, either directly or indirectly, before 
the jury. The benefit to appellant, if any, would have been 
slight. The fact that the effect of the alleged error has no: 
been adequately demonstrated suggests that the alleged error 
was not prejudicial and had no significant effect on the 
outcome of the trial. 
During cross-examination appellant established th~ 
Matheos had previously been convicted of a felony and that he 
had Tade a deal with the State which was contingent upon his 
testifying in this case. The three specific areas of 
ouestions t'iat appellant "'as not allowed to pursue on cross-
examination were adequately adduced before the jury either 
during direct examination by the State, or' indirectly by the 
implications of appellant's questions themselves. The above 
facts, when considered in conjunction with the overwhelming 
evidence other than Matheos 's testimony produced at trial, an: 
t.:-.e :act that appellant h.c.s ::ot lr.;r:tons~r-~~ted how his cause .. 'c: 
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damaged by the alleged error, establish that the restriction 
of cross-examination in this case was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Appellant was effectively given the 
opportunity to adduce before the jury facts sufficient to 
support his contentions regarding Matheos's purported bias and 
motive in testifying. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the conviction and 
sentence should be affirmed. ~ 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of July, 
19 82. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
At7Sk:T1J. w 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF ~AILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Shelden R. 
Carter, Attorney fo;+Apellant, 350 East C:nter 
Utah, 84601, this day of July, 1982. 
Street, Provo, 
Md-.~ 
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